NOTE

HALBERT V. MICHIGAN: THE APPLICATION OF THE DOUGLAS-ROSS DICHOTOMY IN
CONSTITUTIONALIZING INDIGENCY IN STATES’ APPELLATE COURT PROCESSES.

BY OMARI JACKSON*

I. THE BALANCE BETWEEN APPELLATE ACCESS AND JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY
A. A Change in the Michigan Court System
Before 1994, every person convicted of a felony in the State of Michigan had the right to
an automatic appeal with full briefing and oral argument to the Michigan Court of Appeals.1 As
a result, appeals from plea-based convictions in Michigan comprised a substantial portion of the
total cases filed before the Court of Appeals.2 In 1992, as many as one-third of the appeals filed
in the Michigan courts derived from challenges to guilty-pleas, comprising two-thirds of all
criminal appellate cases.3 Because of the potential to overburden the appellate courts with
arguably frivolous appeals from plea-based convictions, the Michigan Legislature sought to
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reduce the number of such cases on appeal.4 The solution adopted by the Legislature was the
proposed amendment to Article I, section 20 of the Michigan Constitution.
In 1994, the citizens of Michigan approved the amendment to Article I, section 20 to
provide that, “In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right…to have an appeal
as a matter of right, except as provided by law an appeal by an accused who pleads guilty or nolo
contendere shall be by leave of the court.”5 After the amendment, criminal defendants who
pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to felonies in Michigan and who maintained that an error
occurred at sentencing or at some other point in the proceedings were only permitted to file
applications for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals.6 If such an application is
granted, the appeal proceeds to full briefing and argument.7 If, on the other hand, the Court of
Appeals denies the application, a standard order will be issued denying leave “for lack of merit
in the grounds presented.”8
B. The Impact of Michigan’s Appellate Court Laws on Indigent Defendants
Prior to the year 2000, a defendant pleading guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nolo
contendere generally received appointment of appellate counsel by Michigan trial judges for
4
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review of the defendant’s conviction or sentence.9 This would change with the development of
section 770.3a of the Michigan Compilation Laws and the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in
People v. Bulger10. In Bulger, the court considered whether the U.S. Constitution secures a right
to appointed counsel for plea-convicted defendants seeking review in the Court of Appeals.11 It
concluded that appointment of counsel is not required for several reasons: 1) Court of Appeals
review following plea-based convictions is by leave and is thus “discretionary”12; 2) plea
proceedings are shorter, simpler, and more routine than trials13; and 3) by entering a plea, a
defendant “accede[s] to the state’s fundamental interest in finality.”14
While the Bulger case was still pending in the Michigan Supreme Court, the Michigan
Legislature enacted section 770.3a.15 This statute provided that a “defendant who pleads guilty,
guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere shall not have appellate counsel appointed for review
of the defendant’s conviction or sentence” unless certain requirements were met that would
9
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provide otherwise.16 The rule granted access to appellate courts for indigent defendants if 1) the
prosecuting attorney seeks leave to appeal; 2) the defendant’s sentence exceeds the upper limit;
3) the defendant seeks leave to appeal a conditional plea; or 4) if the defendant’s application for
leave is granted by either the court of appeals or the supreme court.17 However, if an indigent
raises an issue that does not present an outcome-determinative challenge to the decision by the
trial judge, the statute then forbids trial courts from appointing counsel to assist or handle their
appeal.18 Four years later, the Michigan Supreme Court, in People v. Harris19, determined that
the statute was constitutional as applied under the Bulger standard.20 Following that decision,
the court directed Michigan trial judges to deny counsel to indigent plea defendants
notwithstanding any contrary federal court opinions.21
C. Halbert’s Case for Appellate Counsel
Petitioner Antonio Dwayne Halbert pleaded nolo contendere to two counts of seconddegree criminal sexual conduct.22 During Halbert’s plea colloquy, the trial court inquired, “You
understand if I accept your plea you are giving up or waiving any claim of an appeal as of right.”
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Halbert answered, “Yes, sir.”23 The court further advised Halbert of the circumstances under
which, though the appeal would not be as of right, the court nevertheless “must” or “may”
appoint appellate counsel.24 The court did not, however, inform Halbert that it could not appoint
counsel under other circumstances, including Halbert’s own case.25
One day after receiving consecutive sentences for the two counts of criminal sexual
conduct, Halbert submitted a handwritten motion to withdraw his plea.26 The trial court denied
the motion stating that Halbert’s “proper remedy is to appeal to the Michigan Court of
Appeals.”27 Twice thereafter and to no avail, Halbert requested the trial court to appoint counsel
to assist him in the preparation of an application for leave to appeal to the intermediate appellate
court.28 Halbert argued that his sentence was misscored and that he needed the aid of counsel to
preserve the issue before undertaking an appeal.29 He further claimed that he “required special
education due to learning disabilities,” and was “mentally impaired.”30

Citing the Bulger
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decision concluding that there is no a constitutional right to appointment of appellate counsel to
pursue a discretionary appeal, the trial court denied Halbert’s motion.31
Halbert, acting as a pro se defendant, filed an application for leave to appeal with the
Michigan Court of Appeals using a form supplied by the State.32

He asserted claims of

sentencing error and ineffective assistance of counsel and sought remand for appointment of
appellate counsel and resentencing.33 In a standard form order, the Court of Appeals denied
Halbert’s application “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.”34 Divided five to two, the
Michigan Supreme Court refused to grant Halbert’s application for leave to appeal to that
court.35 This decision prompted Halbert to appeal his case to the United States Supreme Court
for further consideration.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the denial of appointed
counsel to Halbert violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment36. In deciding the outcome of this case, the Court needed to determine whether
Halbert’s case was covered by the precedent established in either Douglas v. California37 or Ross
31
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v. Moffitt38. In Douglas, the Court held that appointed counsel is required for first-tier, as-ofright appellate review.39 The Ross Court held that the appointment of counsel is not required for
discretionary appellate review.40

In essence, the Douglas-Ross framework entitles indigent

defendants to court-appointed counsel on initial appeals of right, but not on subsequent
discretionary appeals.41 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, found the Douglas decision
to be the controlling precedent applicable to the Halbert.42
First, the Court refused to allow the “discretionary” nature of Michigan Court of Appeals
jurisdiction to shift control from Douglas to Ross.43 Justice Ginsburg later reasoned that the
limited legal skills of indigent defendants, together with the complexity of the appellate process,
rendered indigent defendants ill-equipped to proceed pro se in pursuing first-tier appellate
review.44 The Court also concluded that the preparation of review petitions by appellate counsel
rather than pro se defendants would reduce the workload of the Court of Appeals by yielding
more comprehensible applications.45

Finally, it rejected Michigan’s argument that Halbert

waived his right to court-appointed appellate counsel by pleading nolo contendere because,
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according to the Court, he did not recognize the existence of such a right at the time of the
apparent waiver.46
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas defended Michigan’s distinction between
defendants convicted by plea and those convicted by trial.47

He averred that the Halbert

majority’s decision would redistribute resources in favor of plea-convicted defendants with
frivolous appeals at the expense of defendants whose claims were more likely to be
meritorious.48 Justice Thomas further asserted that even if a right to appointed appellate counsel
did exist, the right was nonetheless waived by Halbert during the dialogue in which he entered
his plea.49
D. The Significance of Halbert
The recent decision in Halbert v. Michigan50 provides an in-depth examination of the
fundamental right to gain access to the judicial system to resolve disputes.

This right is

guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.51 The Supreme Court protects
this right from State intervention through the Fourteenth Amendment. In Halbert, the Court

46
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scrutinized the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to determine the measures a State can
take to limit an individual’s right to access the courts.
The Halbert decision also focuses on balancing the State’s interest in reducing the
amount of appeals that an appellate court system hears without infringing upon a person’s
fundamental right. Many state legislatures seek to limit appeals in order to allow the appellate
courts to hear cases not properly decided by the trial court as opposed to frivolous appeals
submitted for ill-defined purposes.

The Halbert Court goes to great lengths to discuss

appropriate steps to protect indigents from invidious discrimination by legislative enactments
that do not adequately achieve the intention sought by the state legislature. It also explains how
providing indigents with appointed appellate counsel will better serve the purpose of judicial
efficiency in the appellate court system as compared to the denial of such services to individuals
with plea-based convictions.
E. Scope of Discussion: How the Court drew the balance between fair process and judicial
efficiency
This note primarily focuses on whether an indigent defendant’s denial of appointed
counsel for an appeal based upon certain circumstances constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part two of this note provides a historical overview of the right to gain access to
the appellate court system in a criminal case. This part begins with the history of the appellate
court system from the late nineteenth century to the twentieth century. Part two also includes an
examination of more recent U.S. Supreme Court cases that dealt with the access of indigent
defendants to the appellate courts. It will conclude with a look at how other intermediate
appellate courts address the challenge of limiting meritless cases filed before appellate courts in
order to maximize the output of judges and staff members.

9

Part three examines the Court’s rationale in Halbert v. Michigan52. This section will
scrutinize Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion holding that the denial of appointment of appellate
counsel amounted to a violation of an indigent defendant’s right to due process and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, there will be a discussion of Justice
Thomas’ dissenting opinion. This opinion delivers a detailed analysis supporting the arguable
infringement of a fundament right of access to the courts in order to allow the States to reduce
the workload of judges serving on the appellate courts.
Part four provides a critical assessment of the Court’s decision while examining the
contrasting views of Justice Thomas. This part focuses on why the U.S. Supreme Court properly
applied a strict scrutiny analysis to hold unconstitutional Michigan’s practice of denying
appointed appellate counsel to indigents convicted by guilty or nolo contendere pleas.
Furthermore, it will explore how providing indigents with the right to appointed counsel serves
to promote fairness in the appellate court system while efficiently and lawfully discouraging the
amount of excessive, non-meritorious filings in order to reduce the overall number of cases heard
by appellate judges. In this section, the writer explains how the Court strategically applied the
Douglas-Ross framework and properly interpreted the holdings in each case to arrive at its
conclusion. This note concludes with an explanation of the impact this decision might have on
the ability of state legislatures to balance the interest of achieving efficiency in the workloads of
appellate court judges without unlawfully denying the fundamental right to access of certain
indigents to the judicial system.

52
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE APPELLATE SYSTEM
A. The Pre-Twentieth Century Approach to Appellate Court Review
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the question of whether a State is obligated to
provide appellate review of criminal convictions in McKane v. Durston53. In this case, John Y.
McKane was convicted of violating certain provisions of the voter registration laws of the State
of New York.54 Upon being sentenced to six years in the state prison, McKane, through counsel,
presented an application for a writ of habeas corpus. McKane argued that he was deprived of his
liberty in violation of the U.S. Constitution by his confinement in conformance with the
sentence.55 McKane further asserted that he was entitled to bail while seeking an appeal of his
criminal conviction.56 Under New York law, a defendant who sought an appeal when a stay of
proceedings occurred may be admitted to make bail as a matter of right when the appeal is from
a final judgment imposing a fine only, or as a matter of discretion in all other cases.57
The Court found that there was no stay of proceedings of the judgment of conviction of
McKane and further that McKane was not entitled to be admitted to bail pending his appeal
under New York law.58 Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, held that an appeal from a
judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute right, independent of constitutional or
53
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statutory provisions permitting appeals.59 The McKane Court continued, stating that a review by
an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case is not a necessary element of due
process of law and is within the discretion of the state to allow or disallow such a review.60 The
Court did not address McKane’s deprivation of liberty without due process of law claim.61
B. The Protection of an Indigent’s Right to Utilize the Appellate Court System
The McKane rationale remained the primary source of law in cases concerning the right
of appellate review. However, it was not until Griffin v. Illinois62 that the Court addressed the
issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects indigent defendants from discrimination by
state action in seeking access to the appellate court system. In Griffin, Petitioners Griffin and
Crenshaw, following their conviction for armed robbery, filed a motion for a certified copy of
the entire record, including a stenographic transcript, without cost to assist them in their appeal.63
They contended that they were poor with no means of paying the necessary fees to acquire the
transcript and court records needed to prosecute an appeal and that denial of their motion would

59

Id.
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Id. at 687-88. The Court noted that the right of appeal may be accorded by the state to the

accused upon “such terms as in its wisdom may be deemed [sic] proper.”
61
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preparing his application for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. The Court, assuming that McKane’s
counsel intended to refer to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, found no
merit in this contention. Id.
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violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.64 The trial
court denied the motion without a hearing.65
Griffin and Crenshaw filed a petition to the Illinois Supreme Court under the Illinois
Post-Conviction Hearing Act.66 This statute allows indigents to obtain a free transcript for
appellate review of constitutional questions but not of other alleged trial errors such as
admissibility and sufficiency of evidence.67 In their petition, Griffin and Crenshaw argued that
there were non-constitutional errors in the trial which entitled them to have their convictions set
aside and that the only impediment to full appellate review was their lack of funds to purchase a
transcript.68 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal by the trial court on the ground
that the charges raised no substantial state or federal constitutional questions as required under
the Post-Conviction Act.69
Upon granting certiorari to Griffin and Crenshaw, the U.S. Supreme Court determined
that they were entitled to a transcript without cost in compliance with the Fourteenth
Amendment.70

Justice Black, writing for the majority, concluded that a State that grants

appellate review cannot do so in a way that discriminates against certain convicted defendants on
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account of their poverty.71 He added that the denial of a court transcript to those unable to pay
for it serves as a “misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special
privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law.”72 The Court, however, allowed the
Illinois Supreme Court to find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review
to indigent defendants.73 Furthermore, the Griffin Court did not hold that Illinois must purchase
a stenographic transcript in every case where a defendant cannot purchase one at his own
expense.74
C. The Douglas-Ross Framework
Eight years after the decision in Griffin v. Illinois75, the U.S. Supreme Court, for the first
time, took up the issue of whether an indigent defendant could be lawfully denied the assistance
of counsel on appeal. In Douglas v. California76, petitioners Meyes and Douglas appealed their
convictions as of right to the California District Court of Appeal. That court later affirmed their
convictions.77

The record showed that Meyes and Douglas requested, and were denied,

assistance of counsel on appeal even though it plainly appeared they were indigents.78 However,
71

Id. at 18.
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the court stated that it examined the record and came to the conclusion that “no good whatever
could be served by appointment of counsel.”79

Subsequently, petitioners sought further

discretionary review in the California Supreme Court, but their petitions were denied without a
hearing.80
The Douglas Court held that an indigent defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel for
first-tier, as-of-right appellate review.81 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas reasoned that
“where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without the
benefit of counsel, an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.”82 The
majority further stated that when an indigent is forced to make a preliminary showing of merit
without assistance, the right to appeal does not comport with fair procedure.83 It concluded that
an indigent’s right to appeal warrants protection by the Fourteenth Amendment against State
prevention of the assistance of appellate counsel.84 The Court later adhered to the Douglas
rationale by holding that comparable materials prepared by trial counsel cannot substitute for an
appellate lawyer’s aid.85 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Clark opined that the California
District Court of Appeal was within their right to make an independent investigation of the
record and in a better position to determine whether it would be helpful and of advantage to the
79
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defendant to have counsel appointed.86 Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Stewart, asserted that the Equal Protection Clause was not apposite, and that its application
would only lead to mischievous results.87 In addition, he stated that the California procedure, in
his opinion, does not violate any provision within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.88
Eleven years after rendering its decision in Douglas v. California89, the Court addressed
the issue of whether appointment of counsel for indigent state defendants should be extended to
require counsel for discretionary state appeals and for applications for review.90 In Ross v.
Moffitt91, respondent Moffitt sought to invoke the discretionary review procedures of the North
Carolina Supreme Court after exhausting his right to appellate review in the North Carolina
Court of Appeals.92 Moffitt also petitioned for discretionary review in the North Carolina
Supreme Court.93 After these appeals and other petitions throughout the state courts were
denied, he sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Middle District

86

Id. at 359 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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during the first appellate review.
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of North Carolina.94 The District Court denied relief and respondent appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.95 The Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s
judgment, holding that Moffitt was entitled to the assistance of counsel at the expense of the
State for his petition for review in both the North Carolina Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court.96 The court stated that “as long as the state provides such procedures and allows
other convicted felons to seek access to the higher court with the help of retained counsel, there
is a marked absence of fairness in denying an indigent the assistance of counsel as he seeks
access to the same court.”97
The Ross Court first noted the distinctions between the need for assistance of counsel
during the trial stage in comparison to the need during appeal.98 Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, stated that in the appellate stage, the defendant needs an attorney “not as a shield to
protect him against being ‘haled into court’ by the State and stripped of his presumption of
innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt.”99

The Court

distinguished this case from Douglas by pointing out that Moffitt’s claims were previously
presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court prior to seeking discretionary
94

Id. at 603-04. Moffitt unsuccessfully petitioned the Superior Court for Guilford County, North

Carolina for court-appointed counsel to prepare a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
95

Id. at 604.
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Id. at 604-05 (quoting Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 654 (1973)).
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review.100 It further stated that the duty of the State is not to replicate the legal arsenal that may
be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse a conviction, but
only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present claims fairly in the
context of the State’s appellate process.101 In holding that the Douglas rationale does not extend
to discretionary appeals, Justice Rehnquist concluded that Moffitt was not denied meaningful
access to North Carolina Supreme Court simply because the State did not appoint counsel to aid
him in seeking discretionary review.102 Apparently, the emphasis in Douglas on the entitlement
to appellate review by right did not carry over to the contrasting discretionary review process in
the opinion of Justice Rehnquist and the majority. Furthermore, mere access, without adequate
counsel, may be insufficient. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, argued that the right to seek discretionary review remains a substantial one in
which a lawyer can be of significant assistance to an indigent defendant.103
D. Recent Developments in the Procedure of Appellate Review: The Civil vs. Criminal Case
Dichotomy
1. The M.L.B. Decision
Approaching the end of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court unequivocally
established that the right to assistance of counsel and court records shall be provided to an

100

Id. at 614.

101

Id. at 616.

102

Id. at 615.

103

Id. at 620 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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indigent defendant in all criminal cases.104 However, the Court never addressed the question of
whether the Douglas-Ross framework applied to “quasi-criminal” cases or cases in which an
indigent’s property rights were at stake.105
In M.L.B. v. S.L.J.106, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied a mother’s petition for leave
to appeal the lower court’s decision to terminate her parental rights.107 The court held that the
dispute was civil in nature and that the right to proceed without paying court costs in civil cases
extends only at the trial level.108 The Supreme Court rejected the claim that the mother’s denial
of her parental rights amounted to a civil case.109 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority,
stated that there was nothing “distinguishable from criminal condemnation” the potential loss a
parent would suffer in losing a custody battle along with the permanent impact it would have.110
The Court noted various statutes from other States that provided appeals for indigents in
parental termination actions.111 It went on to comment that these States deemed cases involving
104

See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (arguing that a State may not block an indigent’s

attempt to appeal because the convicted offense is a misdemeanor as opposed to a felony).
105

See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that a State may not deny an indigent

appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court based its parental
termination decree).
106

Id.

107

Id. at 108-09.

108

Id. at 109.

109

Id. at 119-20.

110

Id.

111

Id. at 122.
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the termination of parental rights to be “quasi-criminal”.112 Because of the property interest a
parent has in raising a child, the Court ruled that to preclude access to appellate review in such a
case would constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.113 The Court further held that the
differentiation of appeals available to indigents as applied by Mississippi amounted to denial of
equal access to resolve disputes through the judicial system.114 It concluded that such actions do
not escape the scope of the Equal Protection Clause.115 Justice Kennedy, separately concurring,
wrote that the State may not erect a barrier to appeals in a criminal case in the form of transcript
and filing costs beyond an indigent’s means.116 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that the majority’s decision would extend beyond the
criminal courts and burden the States to provide free assistance to indigents in civil cases
involving interests similar to the one at issue.117 He further criticized the majority’s reliance on
cases requiring assistance of appellate counsel which he deemed questionable when decided and
which cases have, in his view, since been undermined.118

112

Id. at 122-24.

113

Id. at 123.

114

Id. at 124-28.

115

Id.

116

Id. at 129 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

117

Id. at 129-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist did not join Part II of Justice

Thomas’ dissent in which he argued that he would be inclined to overturn the decision in Griffin
v. Illinois.
118

Id. at 130.
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2. Case-Management Approaches Utilized by the Appellate Courts
Efficiency in the appellate court system is a concern vigorously addressed throughout
judiciaries. One of the approaches intermediate appellate courts took to reduce the surfeit of
cases was to develop case-management systems tailored to the needs of each court’s
jurisdiction.119 For instance, the New Mexico Court of Appeals focused on identifying and
expediting a large number of relatively uncomplicated cases assigning them to half of the staff
attorneys to prepare memorandum for the judges.120 This work enabled the court to make
effective use of the summary calendar while permitting roughly half of the central staff attorney
group to conduct research on cases on the court’s general calendar.121 Courts also rely on
electronic legal research services, computerized management information systems, e-mail and
other forms of modern technology to assist judges and staff members in managing and resolving
cases.122 Although some of these approaches are within the discretion of the appellate court
119

See generally Richard B. Hoffman & Barry Mahoney, Managing Caseflow in State

Intermediate Appellate Courts: What Mechanisms, Practices, and Procedures Can Work to
Reduce Delay?, 35 IND. L. REV. 467 (2002) (providing a study on the approach six appellate
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judges and staff, state legislatures are within their power to decide the jurisdiction of appellate
courts and the responsibilities of personnel.123 The implementation of such tactics began to grow
throughout the United States as more State intermediate appellate courts sought to find methods
to minimize delays and devote a greater amount of attention to meritorious cases.124
III. THE COURT’S CHOICE BETWEEN DOUGLAS AND ROSS
A. The Extension of the Douglas Rationale
Upon granting certiorari to review the Michigan Courts of Appeals’ decision, the United
States Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether the denial of appointed counsel to assist
Halbert during his first-tier leave of appeal violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.125 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that
“No State shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

transmitted to them by the trial courts. Appellate judges and their staffs read
paper briefs. Upon the publication of a written opinion, the paper record is placed
in physical storage. Too often, because of resistance from attorneys, staff, and the
judges themselves, and because resources are unavailable to move to an electronic
environment, appellate courts have not utilized that can facilitate the business of
those courts.
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deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”126 Before addressing
the issue at hand, the Court needed to decide whether Halbert’s case should be aligned with
either Douglas or Ross.127
After reviewing the decisions established in both cases, the Court determined that
Douglas provided the controlling instruction to guide them in resolving the question
presented.128 Prior to reaching this conclusion, Justice Ginsburg first noted that Michigan’s
intermediate appellate court looks to the merits of the claims made in an application for leave to
appeal.129 Thus, the Michigan Court of Appeals, unlike the Michigan Supreme Court, sits as an
error-correction mechanism through which a defendant addresses his application.130 The Court
additionally interjected that indigent defendants pursuing first-tier review in Michigan’s
appellate court system are ill-equipped to represent themselves.131
The Court first analyzed the Michigan appellate system to determine how it relates to the
Douglas-Ross framework previously established.132 Justice Ginsburg distinguished the appellate
review system in Michigan from Ross by pointing out that the Ross Court recognized that leavegranting determinations by North Carolina’s Supreme Court turned on considerations other than
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the commission of error by a lower court.133 By contrast, the Michigan Court of Appeals, as an
error-correction device, is guided in “responding to leave to appeal applications by the merits of
the particular defendant’s claims, not by the general importance of the questions presented.”134
Furthermore, the Court explained that the Court of Appeals’ ruling on a plea-convicted
defendant’s claims provides the first, and likely the only, direct review the defendant’s
conviction and sentence will receive.135 It concluded that a first-tier review applicant, forced to
act pro se, will face a record not reviewed by appellate counsel, and will be equipped with no
attorney’s brief prepared for, or reasoned opinion by, a court of review.136
The Court later discussed the Bulger decision by the Michigan Supreme Court which
held that a pro se defendant seeking discretionary review is adequately armed because he “will
have the benefit of a transcript, trial counsel’s framing of the issues in a motion to withdraw, and
the trial court’s ruling on the motion.137 Justice Ginsburg contended that this ruling was directly
adverse to Douglas and other subsequent Supreme Court rulings.138 She further cited statistical
information on indigent defendants that supported the argument that indigents are put at a severe

133

Id. at 2591. In Ross, the principal criteria for state high court review included “whether the

subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest.” Ross, 417 U.S. at 615.
134

Id.

135

Id. at 2591-92.

136

Id. at 2592.

137

Id. (quoting People v. Bulger, 614 N.W.2d 103,113 (Mich. 2000)).

138

Id.; see also Swenson v. Bolser, 386 U.S. 258 (1967) (per curiam) (holding that comparable

materials prepared by trial counsel are no substitute for an appellate lawyer’s aid).

24

disadvantage in representing themselves on appeal.139

Moreover, the Court stated that

Michigan’s procedures for seeking leave to appeal after sentencing on a plea might serve to
intimidate an indigent defendant who is not assisted with counsel.140
While acknowledging that the State has a legitimate interest in reducing the workload of
its judiciary, the majority concluded that this interest cannot interfere with the fundamental right
of an individual to have access to the courts.141 The Court argued that providing indigents with
appellate counsel will yield applications easier to comprehend while permitting intermediate
state appellate courts to deny leave to appeal in cases not warranting further review.142 Justice
139
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as “charge code(s), MCL citation/PACC Code,” “state the issues and facts
relevant to the appeal, and” “state the law that supports your position and explain
how the law applies to the facts of your case.” This last task “would not be
onerous for an applicant familiar with law school examinations, but it is a tall
order for a defendant of marginal literacy.”
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Ginsburg also disagreed with Michigan’s contention that Halbert waived his right to first-level
appellate review by entering a nolo contendere plea.143 She stated that Halbert was not directly
informed by the trial court that there would be no access to appointed counsel.144 The Court
reasoned that to permit Michigan to require defendants to waive all forms of appeal as a
condition of entering a plea would leave indigents without access to counsel in the narrow range
of circumstances where the State must affirmatively ensure that they receive the legal assistance
necessary to provide meaningful access to the judicial system.145 It later vacated the judgment of
the Michigan Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.146
B. The Dissent Votes in Favor of the Direction of the Ross Decision
Justice Thomas began his dissenting opinion by providing a brief overview of the
purpose behind the enactments created by the Michigan Legislature to reduce the workload in the
Michigan Court of Appeals.147 He also commented how, by the early 1990’s, nearly one-third of
the appeals for over a thousand cases awaiting decisions from the Court of Appeals were
submitted by defendants who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere.148

Going further, Justice

Thomas stated that plea-convicted defendants lack appellate counsel only in certain types of
cases, and only then when they were seeking leave to appeal.149
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Justice Thomas argued that the majority did not specifically state where in the
Constitution that all plea-convicted indigent defendants have the right to appellate counsel when
seeking leave to appeal.150 He claimed that the majority ignores the entirety of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, which does not require paid appellate assistance for indigent criminal defendants,
and relies solely on the Douglas rationale.151 Justice Thomas challenged this approach by
insisting that Michigan did not engage in the sort of invidious discrimination against indigent
defendants condemned in Douglas.152 In his opinion, Michigan did nothing more than recognize
the difference between defendants who plead guilty and those who maintain their innocence, in
an attempt to divert resources from largely frivolous appeals to more meritorious ones.153
Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that because error-correction
review falls within the discretion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, they are required to hear all
appeals that seek such review.154 He argued that, as the Court often considers correcting errors
in both plenary and summary dispositions at its own discretion, the Court of Appeals does not
forfeit its discretion by reviewing errors from lower courts.155 Justice Thomas went on to
150
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challenge the Court’s extension of the Douglas decision to require States to appoint appellate
counsel for discretionary appeals.156 He pointed out that the Ross decision permitted the use of
materials that can aid an indigent defendant in identifying claims appropriate for plenary
review157. In comparing the Ross decision to the Michigan appellate system, Justice Thomas
found that the application for leave to appeal provided instructions for defendants to aid them in
identifying appropriate claims for appeal.158 Moreover, in Justice Thomas’ view, Michigan’s
procedures are more than sufficient to enable discretionary review.159

In sum, the dissent

asserted that the Court was misguided in following the Douglas rationale as opposed to the more
fact-driven precedent established in Ross.160
Justice Thomas’ final argument examined the scope of Halbert’s plea and whether he
waived his right to appointed appellate counsel.161 He claimed that Halbert did not possess a
recognized right to appointed appellate counsel that he could forgo under Michigan law.162
Accordingly, the majority’s conclusion that Michigan law prohibited Halbert from exercising
this right was irrelevant in Justice Thomas’ opinion.163 Furthermore, Justice Thomas asserted
that even if Halbert was entitled to appellate counsel, he waived his right during his plea
156
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colloquy.164 Such dialogue, Justice Thomas concluded, fell within the Court’s jurisprudence for
determining when a person adequately waives legal rights.165
IV. PROMOTING FAIRNESS WHILE PRESERVING EFFICIENCY
A. Drawing the Line between Douglas and Ross
Justice Black argued that there can be no equal justice where the kind of appeal a man
enjoys “depends on the amount of money he has.”166 In Douglas, the Court clarified that when
an indigent defendant is entitled to a first-tier review of his case, the State must provide the
benefit of counsel to assist in handling his appeal.167 In contrast and by distinction, the Ross
Court held that appointment of counsel is not required for discretionary appellate review.168
Neither of these cases addressed the question of whether an indigent defendant is entitled to
assistance of appellate counsel during a first-tier discretionary review. Such an insight must turn
on the similarities of the facts in comparison to the dispute before the Halbert Court. Arguably,
if a person is only permitted one opportunity to appeal a lower court decision at the discretion of
the appellate court system invoking jurisdiction, it is reasonable to maintain that such an
opportunity falls within the realm of first-tier review. Furthermore, the facts in Halbert are more
similar in detail to those presented to the Douglas Court in determining the right to appellate
counsel for an as-of-right appeal.

Justice Ginsburg failed to specifically state which facts

distinguish Halbert’s case from the one before the Ross Court; however, it can be inferred that
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the majority found the Douglas rationale more beneficial in determining the outcome of the issue
at hand. Furthermore, the Ginsburg analysis mentioned fidelity with Justice Black’s caveat that
access to appellate review should not be reduced to a question of money.
Although the dissent relies heavily on the Ross Court’s analysis in refusing to extend
Douglas to discretionary appeals, there are some key factual differences that support the Court’s
approach in Halbert. In Ross, Moffitt exhausted the appeals he was entitled to as of right with
the assistance of counsel before seeking habeas relief in the federal courts.169 By the time he
exercised his discretionary appeal, Moffitt received the full panoply of guarantees the Douglas
Court held were in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment.170 To extend the Douglas
rationale to individuals in Moffitt’s circumstances would not serve the best interest of promoting
fair process while preserving efficiency in the intermediate state appellate courts. The result
would be an overwhelmed appellate judiciary with matters already properly decided on the
merits by lower courts.

An incorrect extension of the Douglas rationale would erode the

effectiveness of decisions rendered and lessen the access of indigents with meritorious appeals.
In short, a proper balancing mechanism is necessary to address States’ legitimate concerns for
resource allocation.
In contrast, by allowing individuals like Halbert, with only one opportunity to file an
appeal, to have assistance of counsel in determining if there are adequate grounds to support an
appeal, the same result would not occur. The appellate courts remain within their discretion to
decide these disputes on the merits with or without hearing oral arguments on the issues
169
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presented. Furthermore, the assistance of appellate counsel in first-tier reviews complies with
the history of American jurisprudence that seeks to promote the fundamental right of access to
the courts. Therefore, the Court properly extended the reasoning in Douglas to provide an
indigent defendant the right to assistance of counsel in all first-tier appellate reviews regardless
of whether they are appeals as of right, or discretionary appeals.
B. Protecting Indigent Defendants Helps Ensure Due Process for All
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Ross v. Moffitt171, stated that “the technical requirements
for applications for writs of certiorari are hazards which one untrained in the law could hardly be
expected to negotiate.”172 Section 770.3a creates a limited choice for those persons that fall
within the scope of the statute: either fill out an application to seek a discretionary appeal without
the assistance of a court-appointed attorney or waive any right to appeal that might exist upon
receiving a plea-based conviction. The latter choice strips the defendant of any chance to resolve
an issue even if there is a clear presence of a reversible error. The former, on the other hand,
provides a complex method in which a defendant must be able to state a legal claim without
possessing the knowledge to spot an issue and the skill to articulate it before a panel of legal
scholars.173 It is without question that the Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to
provide appellate review of criminal convictions.174 However, when a State provides such an
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avenue, it must neither bolt the door to equal justice nor support a wasteful abuse of the appellate
process.175
The State’s responsibility under the Due Process Clause is to provide justice for all.176
There is no guarantee that a trial attorney representing a non-indigent defendant will adequately
inform his client of any issues appropriate for appellate review.177 Under the Michigan appellate
system, if a non-indigent does not wish to retain the trial attorney to handle an appeal, there is no
difference between the non-indigent and the indigent defendant as far as access to the appellate
courts is concerned.178 Neither will have the opportunity to the benefit of appointed counsel
from the courts. Unless the non-indigent is in a position to afford another attorney to handle an
appeal, he, like the indigent, will have no way to receive sufficient legal assistance in seeking a
reversal of the trial court’s decision. This creates a significant burden on the fundamental right
of access to the courts on all citizens, indigent and non -indigent, wishing to correct a harmful
error made during a plea-based conviction. Although the State has a compelling interest in
reducing the workload of intermediate appellate courts, such an interest cannot thwart a
fundamental right granted under the Due Process Clause.
The Halbert rationale serves as the alternative that falls within the purpose and intent of
the Due Process Clause. The right to assistance of appellate counsel furthers the goal of creating
fair and reasonable legislation that promotes a legitimate governmental objective. The expansion
of this right provides a meaningful remedy for indigents to assert well-established fundamental
175
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rights without interference from the state legislatures. It also permits indigents and non-indigents
the ability to receive the assistance necessary when a legitimate appeal exists. Moreover, this
method still allows States to achieve the objective of reducing the workload of appellate courts
through the actions of judicial and legislative bodies. In sum, applying the Halbert decision,
State legislatures promote the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Due Process Clause while
permitting them to find ways to address concerns of overburdening appellate courts.
C. Securing Efficient Justice through Equal Protection
Most indigent defendants lack the skill, knowledge and ability to capably navigate the
appellate process alone.179

Both the Halbert Court and the Michigan Supreme Court

acknowledged that the appointment of appellate counsel at state expense would be more efficient
and helpful not only to indigent defendants, but also to the appellate courts.180 Justice Ginsburg
properly relied on statistical information as evidence to conclude that indigent defendants are
“handicapped as self-representatives.”181 Moreover, neither Justice Thomas nor the State of
Michigan demonstrates that allowing indigent defendants assistance from court-appointed
counsel would create a severe burden on the appellate court system that can survive an equal
protection challenge.
Applying the Equal Protection Clause to ensure indigent defendants assistance of
appellate counsel in first-tier discretionary appeals provides the best tool to assist in creating a
more efficient appellant court system.

The defendant’s counsel can review the record to

ascertain if there is a legitimate claim worthy of arguing on appeal. Providing assistance of
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counsel will not lead to an unreasonable increase in the number of appeals filed in the appellate
courts.182 Appellate court judges will be able to better comprehend and understand arguments
presented by an attorney on behalf of an indigent defendant. This allows the judges to render
efficient decisions on meritorious appeals in an expeditious manner. Furthermore, the Halbert
decision still permits appellate courts to deny leave applications in those cases where further
review will only cause improper delay.183
When State action seeks to limit an indigent defendant’s access to the appellate court
system, the Equal Protection Clause serves to balance the interests of both parties. Here, the
majority acknowledged that a State has a legitimate interest in limiting the number of frivolous
appeals filed in its judiciary.184 However, such an interest cannot override nor infringe upon an
indigent’s fundamental right to access to the courts. The practice of applying a strict-scrutiny
analysis in cases dealing with an indigent defendant’s right to appointment of counsel is
consistent throughout the Court’s jurisprudence.185 Although some might argue that a rationalbasis analysis is the better test to determine whether the State action violates the Equal Protection
Clause, such an argument cannot be supported by an examination of established precedent. The
dispute centers on the protection of a fundamental right and not on the classification of the
individual asserting that right. Therefore, the appointment of counsel administers a fair process
182
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to allow indigent defendants meaningful access to the courts while providing more efficient
measures for reducing the workload of appellate courts.
D. Rebutting the Dissent
The majority clearly relies on the provisions guaranteed under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Throughout her opinion, Justice Ginsburg
mentions the significant disadvantages indigent defendants suffer under section 770.3a.186 This
statute, as applied by Michigan, does nothing more than infringe upon the indigent’s right to
meaningful access to the courts. It cannot be said, as Justice Thomas argued, that the Court’s
argument is not supported by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Halbert Court
might not point specifically to a portion of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to
support its position. However, looking at the language of section 770.3a and how it was applied
by the Michigan Court of Appeals, there is no doubt, as the majority contended, that the statute
serves as a form of invidious discrimination in its application. Access to appellate relief is
effectively denied based upon a distinction no more complex than a matter of financial resources.
Justice Thomas relied heavily on the decision in Ross v. Moffitt187 to conclude that the
majority’s decision unduly burdens States to provide assistance of counsel to indigent
defendants. However, as noted above, the Ross decision does not provide a similar set of facts to
conclude that it provides the best source of precedent in comparison to Douglas. That both Ross
and Halbert dealt with discretionary appeals does not, alone, suffice to support an argument that
the two cases are indistinguishable. Given that Moffitt sought a discretionary appeal after
exercising all of his as-of-right appeals, the use of materials provided by the trial court would not
186
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constitute a violation of due process or equal protection.188 However, the same cannot be said
about the instructions presented in Halbert’s application for leave of appeal, which did arguably
raise a due process issue.189 Although Justice Thomas is correct in stating that appellate courts
are not required to hear all appeals that are within its discretion, the majority does not propose
such a measure in rendering its decision. Instead, it suggests a method in which state appellate
courts can secure indigents’ fundamental rights without interfering with judicial discretion.
Justice Thomas dedicated a significant amount of his dissent arguing that Halbert waived
any right to a court-appointed appellate counsel during his colloquy.190 While it is true that a
person can waive any legal rights provided by the Constitution, this does not appear supported by
an examination of the plea colloquy. Halbert clearly was aware that some of his rights would be
terminated upon entering a plea of nolo contendere. However, the trial judge only listed a few
instances in which he would not receive a court-appointed attorney to handle his appeal.191
Thus, Halbert’s decision to waive any rights to appeal was tainted in that he did not fully
understand its effect. In conclusion, the Court correctly held that Halbert’s plea was not made
with the knowledge sufficient to constitute a satisfactory waiver of the access to appointed
counsel.
V. CONCLUSION
The requirement of due process and equal protection in the judicial system is a necessity
in providing all individuals with the opportunity to have their cases decided fairly. Although the
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reduction of frivolous appeals is a compelling governmental interest, it is not one that can deny
indigent defendants access to the appellate court system during a first-tier review. The Halbert
decision does not create a situation where the States will not be able to limit the number of
appeals submitted before appellate judges. Moreover, the States are still within their will to find
alternatives that will reduce the volume of cases heard to prevent undue burdens on the courts
without limiting indigent defendants’ right to gain access to the courts.
The steps taken by other appellate courts throughout the United States supports the notion
that judicial efficiency does not require the infringement of fundamental rights. However, it is
not clear whether state legislatures will completely follow the Halbert rationale. Some States
may continue to propose laws that fall within the scope of Halbert but do not clearly infringe
upon those rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. While it is uncertain whether
the Court will continue to follow Halbert in future cases, it is clear that such future laws will
need to survive a strict scrutiny analysis in order to be deemed constitutional.
The Halbert decision creates a new roadmap for courts to follow in balancing the
interests of the State and indigent defendants. The majority’s approach protects indigents from
invidious discrimination by legislative enactments that do not adequately achieve the intention
sought by the state legislature.

Moreover, it presents the best method to advance judicial

efficiency in the appellate court system as compared to the denial of such services to individuals
with plea-based convictions. Thus, providing indigent defendants with the right to appointed
counsel serves to promote fairness in the appellate court system while efficiently reducing the
amount of cases heard by appellate judges.
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